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ABSTRACT
Kanjogera looms large in Rwandan history as a Queen Mother
(1895–1931) – a position equal to that of the king – who wielded
extraordinary political power. While she was not the ﬁrst Rwandan
woman to exercise this kind of power, she is arguably the most
widely remembered in Rwandan popular culture largely due to
the brutalities she allegedly inﬂicted upon her perceived enemies.
But why do Kanjogera’s violent excesses stand out when other
monarchical ﬁgures also occasionally used violence to maintain or
expand their power? What might the way her name is invoked in
the present tell us about modern Rwandan gender norms and
people’s attitudes toward women who exercise signiﬁcant political
power? We respond to these questions by examining the
permissible behaviours of Rwandan women political elites in
historical perspective. Following an overview of Kanjogera’s
political legacy, we turn our attention to two First Ladies, Agathe
Kanziga (1973–1994) and Jeannette Kagame (2000-present) who,
for diﬀerent reasons, are occasionally referred to as modern
incarnations of Kanjogera. In these two cases, we argue
Kanjogera’s name serves as a rhetorical device that reveals
ongoing anxieties about women exercising signiﬁcant political
power, while simultaneously undermining the politically
prominent men with whom they are associated.
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In the twenty-ﬁrst century, Rwanda has become a beacon for women’s empowerment
within Africa and globally. Its reputation is largely grounded in the eﬀorts of post-
genocide Rwandan civil society groups and the ruling party, the Rwandan Patriotic
Front (RPF), to mainstream gender equality in politics and throughout its various devel-
opment and transitional justice initiatives.1 The genocide began following the assassina-
tion of Hutu President Juvénal Habyarimana (r. 1973–1994), at the height of
international negotiations to end the three-year civil war with the RPF.2 Hutu Power extre-
mists aﬃliated with the nation’s Hutu majority attempted to exterminate the RPF’s per-
ceived support base – the nation’s political opposition and Tutsi minority population –
resulting in an estimated 800,000 civilian causalities.3 As part of their broader genocidal
plan, Hutu Power extremists overtly advocated for the use of rape and other forms of
sexual violence against women, including Tutsi women and women married to Tutsi
men, resulting in an estimated 250,000–500,000 women victims of sexual assault.4
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In the genocide’s aftermath, some Rwandan women – particularly those who were able
to mobilize as genocide survivors – have had great success advocating for women’s
inclusion in domestic and international policy debates.5 In the process, they have been
able to work with the Rwandan government to criminalize gender-based violence and
domestic violence, and grant women and girls inheritance rights, among other advances.6
Today, Rwanda is particularly celebrated for the 2013 parliamentary elections in which
women secured 64% of seats in the Chamber of Deputies, dramatically altering the
nation’s previously male-dominated political landscape.7 For many observers, this was a
signiﬁcant step toward gender equality in a society that prior to the genocide was domi-
nated by “deeply entrenched patriarchal systems” in which “Rwanda’s women were hard
pressed for a space to exercise agency”.8
While there is ample research that frames modern Rwanda as deeply patriarchal, there
is a need for careful contextualization of Rwanda’s gender politics prior to the nation’s
independence in 1962, and especially before colonization in 1896. Indeed, scholars
know very little about Rwandan women and their contributions to their communities
and nation prior to independence. Understanding the historical roles and gender norms
that determined Rwandan women’s agency prior to the colonial period is limited by the
relative dearth of primary source materials and academic interest in women’s lives.
However, there are occasional examples of women who ﬁgure prominently within the his-
toriography, all of whom were elites aﬃliated with the monarchy who acted both in “tra-
ditional” roles and in overt opposition to the assumed contemporary Rwandan gender
norms in order to exercise political power.
This article focuses on one such example of a powerful elite woman whose name has sur-
vived in the present: Umugabekazi (Queen Mother) Kanjogera (r. 1895–1931). She looms
large in modern Rwandan popular culture for overthrowing her adopted son Rutarindwa
(r. 1895–1896) so her biological son Musinga (r. 1896–1931) could be mwami (king). She
then exterminated those court notables who allegedly opposed his reign. But beyond her
transformative impact on Rwanda, Kanjogera’s name persists in present-day popular
culture for another reason – to cast aspersion on modern Rwandan women elites who are
perceived as exercising substantial political power independent of or in tandem with their
politically prominent husbands. To explore this phenomenon, we consider two vastly
diﬀerent Rwandan First Ladies who are occasionally referenced as modern incarnations of
Kanjogera: Agathe Kanziga, the widely condemned wife of former President Habyarimana,
who was allegedly a central ﬁgure in the genocidal Hutu Power extremist movement that
emerged toward the end of his regime; and Jeannette Nyiramongi Kagame, the widely cele-
brated wife of current President Paul Kagame, whose visibility in Rwandan politics largely
relates to her charity work and eﬀorts to promote women’s empowerment.9 In analysing
the manner in which these prominent women’s critics use the label “Kanjogera” to
condemn them, we reveal ongoing anxieties within Rwanda related to women’s political
authority, both real or perceived. Simultaneously, such critiques are also instrumental for
undermining the political power of the men with whom these First Ladies are associated.
Rwandan gender norms in historical perspective
Prior to discussing Kanjogera and the modern women political elites who are occasionally
tarnished with her name, however, it is important to consider the current state of
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knowledge related to Kanjogera and the gender norms she would have navigated during
her life. Beginning with the Nyiginya kingdom – whose abami (kings) belonged to the
powerful Abanyiginya clan – historians such as Alexis Kagame, Peter Schumacher, and
Jan Vansina oﬀer occasional insights on early Rwandan gender norms.10 Each preserved
invaluable collections of oral traditions maintained by court historians, ritualists, and
other experts ﬁltered through the lens of the rapidly shifting cultural and political
climate associated with Rwanda’s colonization by Germany (1895–1916) and Belgium
(1916–1962). While none of these early historians engaged in sustained analysis of
women’s historical contributions within the Nyiginya kingdom, and particularly not
those of non-elite women, Vansina concluded that
the social position of women was complex and variable… In principle they were inferior to
one man—this was most evidence in the case of women married to farmers since women
could not control any land, but it was also apparent among herders despite women’s right
to own cattle. Usually their status derived from that of their fathers, husbands, or sons.11
To this end, Vansina identiﬁed a “sharp” division of labour by gender within the house-
hold that left women with primary responsibility for cleaning and maintaining the family
home, preparing food, and raising children.12 However, he noted that “age and personality
were of considerable importance” for women’s authority13 In particular, older married
women were often set up in their own households and in this capacity enjoyed consider-
able authority. Vansina also highlighted women who exercised “mystical power inherent
in femininity and human fecundity”, noting that “[s]ome women became famous as magi-
cians or healers, and above all as prophets”.14 However, Vansina typically presented these
potentially prominent women as footnotes to the broader history of the Abanyiginya
abami that he sought to establish, a pattern that persists across contemporary historical
studies of the Nyiginya kingdom.
For the ﬁrst half of Rwanda’s colonial period, historian Alison Des Forges analyzed the
reign of Mwami Musinga, including the central role that Kanjogera played in court aﬀairs.
Des Forges emphasized that in some families – particularly among Tutsi and members of
Kanjogera’s powerful Abega clan, from which many of the Abanyiginya abami took their
abamikazi (queens) – the power that a mother had over her son “often persisted even after
he was thrust into the largely masculine world…”15 While Des Forges was, in this
instance, contextualizing the elite gender norms that allowed Kanjogera to exercise
power within Musinga’s court, she raises the provocative possibility that women other
than the reigning Umugabekazi might have enjoyed similar power within their families
and communities when she notes that Rwandans used the term ubukururamweko (“trail-
ing a woman’s sash after one’s self”) in reference to men who were dominated by their
mothers.16 Much like the historians who preceded her, however, Des Forges did not
analyse the lives of women other than Kanjogera, making it impossible to oﬀer general
conclusions about women’s authority within their families.
Fortunately, anthropologist Helen Codere provided rare insights on gender norms
across Rwanda’s colonial period as they pertained to women from a range of socioeco-
nomic backgrounds. In doing so, she emphasized the vast changes that contemporary
Rwandan women – including elites like Kanjogera – were navigating as a result of colo-
nialization. Codere acknowledged that many Tutsi women “knew comfort, freedom
from hard physical work, and relative economic security” compared to their Hutu
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compatriots, who were typically impoverished and expected – as subsistence farmers – to
perform “unremitting physical labour” to support their families.17 However, she observed
that as Rwandan men became “Europeanized men in European occupations”, Rwandan
women, regardless of ethnicity or socio-economic status, faced heightened economic hard-
ship and social stigma. This was particularly the case where women were associated with
long-standing practices like divination or concubinage that were being rejected by the
growing number of converts to Christianity in their communities.18 Similarly, throughout
the autobiographies that Codere documented, the women featured their marriages as their
“greatest moment of social recognition and exposure”, after which they could realize their
potential as good wives and mothers.19 The emphasis on Rwandan women being good
wives and mothers – a theme that also persists in gender norms associated Rwanda’s
post-independence period – thus seems well-established prior to independence, at least
as presented by Rwandans to scholars who conducted research during Rwanda’s colonial
period. The near-total exclusion of women from most public spheres, and particularly
politics, however, was a relatively new phenomenon that emerged during Rwanda’s colo-
nial period.
Kanjogera: the apex and downfall of women’s monarchical power
Kanjogera’s reign as umugabekazi thus occurred amidst great cultural and political change
in Rwanda. She rose to power as the favourite wife of Mwami Rwabugiri (r. 1863–1895) – a
warrior king who relied on terror to expand and maintain control of conquered territories
– and was chosen to serve as the umugabekazi of Rwabugiri’s chosen successor, Rutar-
indwa, his adoptive son and co-regent during the last ﬁve years of his reign.20 However,
Kanjogera had a biological son by Rwabugiri whom she wanted to become mwami.
Belgian incursions in the region provided the perfect opportunity to undermine Rutarind-
wa’s authority. Kanjogera and her brothers encouraged Rutarindwa to engage the Belgians
in battle at Shangi in western Rwanda. His warriors’ inevitable defeat, including the deaths
of some of Rwanda’s best ﬁghters, exposed the weakness of Rutarindwa’s military,
prompting concerns about his leadership.21 Kanjogera then used this defeat to isolate
Rutarindwa from his court notables and amass support for a coup.
In December 1896, while Rutarindwa was camped with minimal security at Rucunshu –
the site that was to become his new residence – Kanjogera’s brother Kabare rallied his
army against him. The resulting battle was one-sided and most of Rutarindwa’s supporters
were either killed in battle or, faced with certain defeat, suicided. The battle ended when
Rutarindwa set his house on ﬁre, killing himself and destroying the ritual artefacts associ-
ated with the kingship.22 Among these treasures was the drum Kalinga, which signiﬁed
kingly legitimacy and without which Kanjogera’s son, Musinga, would face challenges
in convincing the court of his legitimacy.23 Kabare, however, had conﬁdence in the
Abega clan’s ability to shore up support for Musinga’s claim. In response to Kanjogera’s
concern regarding the destruction of the royal drum, he allegedly said: “We have the
mwami, we can make the drum”.24 In the years that followed, Kanjogera and her suppor-
ters “relied primarily on execution and pillage, or the threat of them” to silence critique of
Musinga’s legitimacy.25 In this manner, Kanjogera was directly responsible for undermin-
ing the functional superiority of the Abanyiginya clan and ensuring that her son was
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surrounded almost exclusively by Abega advisors, enacting a remarkable transformation
of political power within the monarchy.
Having eliminated the main threats to Musinga’s rule, Kanjogera settled into a more
acceptable role for an umugabekazi, which involved serving in public as a dutiful
mother and supporting her son’s leadership from behind the scenes. Yet Kanjogera con-
tinued to wield great power over Musinga’s aﬀairs. She was instrumental in negotiating an
alliance with the Germans against the Belgians and the British that allowed Musinga and
his court to maintain power without undue interference from these colonizing powers. She
accomplished this in part by employing her other brother, Ruhinankiko, who was over
seven feet tall, as a negotiator for Musinga during early meetings with the Germans, to
which she listened from behind a screen in the royal household.26
Rwandan popular culture abounds with narratives related to Kanjogera’s violent
excesses, both prior to and during her tenure as umugabekazi. The story behind how Kan-
jogera became Rwabugiri’s favourite wife is notable here:
Giharamagara was the beer maker of the king.27 One day, [Mwami or king] Rwabugiri told
Giharamagara to give him some beer for Rwabugiri’s servants, but Giharamagara refused,
saying there was no beer. Rwabugiri became angry and they started ﬁghting. In the house,
they were with the queen Nyirayuhi (Kanjogera) only; the servants were outside waiting to
receive the beer because they were supposed to be called when the beer was going to be avail-
able. For that, no one knew what was happening inside the house. Giharamagara held Rwa-
bugiri and threw him on the ﬂoor, strangling each other; when Nyirayuhi saw that she
became angry and grabbed a sword to defend her husband. She killed Giharamagara and
he fell down.
Rwabugiri asked his wife what she wanted as a reward, between his land and his cattle which
were in a very big number; the wife replied that she only wanted to be his favorite and most
cherished wife. Then Rwabugiri accepted to give that to her.28
This narrative reveals several elements of Kanjogera’s personality that are commonly high-
lighted in Rwandan popular culture. Kanjogera’s prowess with a sword – an impressive
blade she allegedly called ruhuga (killer) – is legendary, as are the atrocities she perpetrated
with it as presented in the following account documented in 1972:
The Queen Mother also had the power to kill. Like Nyirayuhi…Whenever she said that
‘ruhuga is thirsty,’ a healthy baby would be brought in, fed with milk and then put before
the Queen Mother, who would then place her sword on the baby’s tummy to support
herself as she got up.29
These popular narratives also highlight Kanjogera’s unpredictable temper and penchant
for bloodshed. For a woman, even a political elite, to have learned to handle a sword
with competence is exceptional. A review of the literature on Rwandan gender norms
prior to the genocide suggests women were not allowed on the battleﬁeld until after the
ﬁghting had ceased, and even prohibited from handling weapons as it was believed that
this would bring bad fortune upon the owner, resulting in his injury or death.30 Similarly,
there are taboos that prohibit women from engaging in physical violence, particularly
against children.31 Instead, the literature suggests that Rwandan women were valued for
being nyampinga, a term that encapsulates such ideals as purity, innocence, and maternal
care rather than political cunning, physical strength, and other qualities associated with
hegemonic masculinity in Rwanda.32 To this end, popular narratives abound wherein
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Kanjogera smokes a pipe, which in modern Rwanda is typically regarded as a masculine
activity, except where women are post-menopausal.33 She also allegedly blinded the court
historian Kayijuka for bringing Europeans into her compound while she was bathing.34
Popular memory in Rwanda thus highlights Kanjogera’s cunning and her desire for
political power, as well as the ease with which she exercised said power, whether directly
or through court agents. Such qualities are particularly evident in the way that Kanjogera
approached potential political subversives, such as Muhumusa – another elite woman who
led an important rebellion in the north against Musinga and the Abega-dominated court
in the early 1900s.35 Muhumusa’s claim to authority had similar roots to that of Kanjogera
– both claimed to have been married to Rwabugiri and to have produced sons with him,
though the oﬃcial historical narratives only recognize Kanjogera’s claims as legitimate.36
However, Muhumusa was a medium of Nyabingi, a mythical queen who allegedly ruled
the northern region of Ndorwa long ago, and whose spirit could possess people, allowing
them to perform miracles.37 Muhumusa thus had great spiritual authority in addition to
political authority, which helped her amass followers in northern Rwanda, where she ﬂed
following the coup at Rucunshu.38 In response to Muhumusa’s rebellion, Kanjogera
sought out German support to secure Musinga’s position in exchange for increased mis-
sionary access across Rwanda. In 1912, the Germans collaborated with the British to
launch a military campaign to restore political stability in northern Rwanda, capturing
Muhumusa and conﬁning her to house arrest. Subsequently, Kanjogera increasingly
turned to the Europeans to secure her and Musinga’s position. Their increasing reliance
on the colonizers, however, undermined their monarchical authority by demonstrating
that they needed the Europeans to successfully rule Rwanda. As European and Roman
Catholic ideals spread within Rwanda, the monarchy arguably became less salient in
many Rwandans’ lives.39 By the time Kanjogera and Musinga released their precarious
position and tried to resist Belgian interference, the Belgians were able to depose
Musinga (and, by extension Kanjogera) with minimal resistance from the royal court,
and empower his missionary-educated son, Rudahigwa (r. 1931–1959).
Neo-tradition and the changing face of women’s authority
Taken together, what is notable about the qualities attributed to Kanjogera is the degree to
which they relate to her transgression of Rwandan gender norms that dictate the appro-
priate behaviour of women, at least since the spread of Roman Catholicism in Rwanda.
Similarly notable is the iconic nature of stories about Kanjogera over time, and the
extent to which Kanjogera continues to be referenced as “treacherous and illegitimate”,
among other perceived unwomanly qualities, rather than celebrated as a cunning and at
times highly eﬀective political ﬁgure, for example.40 But Kanjogera lived and ruled
during a period of profound upheaval and transition in Rwanda, which were in part a
direct result of her actions. Though she has received little credit (or blame) in historical
scholarship until recently, the oral traditions curated by Rwandan historians and storytel-
lers are replete with stories that centre Kanjogera’s role in the 1896 coup at Rucunshu, an
in negotiating with the Germans to subdue various rebellions, and secure her and her son’s
position.41 These narratives portray her as an elite attempting to stabilize her position as
her royal predecessors, both men and women, had done. Her continued inclusion in these
narratives also seems dependent upon the narrator in question. Some historians, like Jan
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Vansina’s key informant, Jean Mugina, present her as a powerful actor, while others
diminish her role in shaping Rwandan politics and history.
Yet Kanjogera does not feature as prominently in the scholarship of the proliﬁc his-
torian Alexis Kagame, nor in other historical work from the colonial and independence
periods, the majority of which was produced by European scholars.42 She was rewritten
into the historiography by Alison Des Forges in her analysis of Musinga’s reign, based in
part on oral histories.43 For this reason, the historical record of Kanjogera’s life is critical
because of the varied ways she has been represented in scholarship and among the
public. Her continued inclusion in sources closest to the monarchy – stemming from
court historians recorded by Vansina – contrasts with histories that privileged colonial
or church documents over Rwandan sources. Though modern Rwanda’s antecedent
kingdom was certainly patriarchal, it was not devoid of women in positions of insti-
tutional power – nor were these women transgressing contemporary Rwandan gender
norms in taking on these positions.44 Yet in Rwanda, as in other African nations, colo-
nial authorities often erased powerful women from their histories, either by downplay-
ing their importance or by ignoring them altogether. Where indirect rule was employed,
positions of authority went almost exclusively to men, and variable gender systems were
often ignored in favour of the more binary European model.45 These changes beneﬁted
men in colonized societies, giving them opportunities to subordinate previously power-
ful women.
As mentioned previously, the concept of nyampinga governed, at least in theory, the
expectations for Rwandan women, emphasizing feminine virtues of purity and inno-
cence over ambition and political savvy. By their very nature, abagabekazi (queen
mothers) deﬁed this, as did abamikazi who helped their husbands govern by holding
court, overseeing herds, and in some cases managing armies. Elite women were less
bound by convention due to their proximity to power. Some, like Kanjogera, used
this to their advantage to bolster their individual, familial, and clan ambitions. But
this does not mean that they were loved or celebrated for it. This became increasingly
the case during the colonial period, as rising anti-monarchical sentiment was bolstered
by a European patriarchal morality associated with the spread of Roman Catholicism, to
which Mwami Rudahigwa formally converted in the mid-1940s.46 Interestingly, some
missionaries in the Great Lakes of Africa recognized the importance of women’s spiri-
tual leadership and sought to channel it in a manner that aligned with Catholic theol-
ogy, encouraging worship of the Virgin Mary in place of Nyabingi, for example.47 Aside
from this ongoing mechanism for exercising spiritual authority, however, women’s roles
within the monarchy diminished, and they became conspicuously absent from politics as
Rwanda neared independence.
In this context, it is easier to grasp why a ﬁgure like Kanjogera could become a target of
critique of anti-monarchical forces. Though she was not unusually violent for a monarch,
she certainly violated popular understandings of what a “good woman” by Rwandan stan-
dards should be. Her grandson Rudahigwa worked hard to not only unify Rwandans, but
to resist the colonial rule that Kanjogera had once courted. Thus, as Rwanda moved
toward independence, she became the perfect villain – a violent woman who revelled in
the excesses of power, controlling the men around her, and scheming with foreigners
who subsequently implemented policies that intensiﬁed forced labour, discrimination,
and division. Without a strong women’s movement ﬁghting to reclaim the historical
90 S. E. WATKINS AND E. JESSEE
position of these women elites, Kanjogera could easily ﬁll the role of national scapegoat: a
woman, to satisfy the patriarchs, and an umugabekazi, to satisfy the anti-monarchists.
In sum, Kanjogera is arguably the best-known umugabekazi to modern Rwandans,
though her discursive image is used in a variety of ways. She becomes the avatar of the
alleged tyranny and depravity of Tutsi elites prior to independence, and a ﬁgure
through which people express their anxieties around women exercising political power
in the present. She is also used to undermine the authority of the men with whom powerful
or ambitious women are associated. This trend is most evident in a form of protest that has
emerged in response to two modern Rwandan women’s eﬀorts to exercise some modicum
of visible political power – First Ladies Agathe Kanziga and Jeanette Kagame – to whom
we now turn our attention.
Agathe Kanziga
In discussing modern Rwandan women who are referenced as Kanjogera in popular
culture, Agathe Kanziga is the most prevalent example. Indeed, in recent history there
are few women in Rwanda who are so consistently reviled by historians and the public
alike. Kanziga is descended from the matridynastic Abagesera clan, as well as one of the
Hutu Abahinza lineages who ruled Rwanda’s northern communities as late as the
1920s.48 Once a small autonomous kingdom, the arrival of superior German weaponry
and other factors associated with the advent of colonialism convinced its leaders to gradu-
ally submit to incorporation into Musinga’s Rwanda. Kanziga’s family was nonetheless
able to maintain extensive regional power and inﬂuence throughout the First Hutu Repub-
lic that took shape under the post-independence leadership of President Grégoire Kayi-
banda (r. 1962–1973).49 Ultimately, Kanziga’s family rallied in support of her husband
– who then served as the Army Chief of Staﬀ – to orchestrate the “bloodless coup” that
deposed Kayibanda in 1973.50 Her family connections granted Habyarimana’s bid for
power an element of historical and political legitimacy that was otherwise missing.
Though he was a civil servant and very popular among the Rwandan military, Habyari-
mana did not come from a powerful and storied lineage like Kanziga.
Historian Sarah Watkins argues that Kanziga embodied the essence of the abagabekazi
at a point when this position and its monarchical context had formally ceased to exist.51
Kanziga ensured that her family held politically inﬂuential positions in Habyarimana’s
presidency. Her three brothers Protais Zigiranyirazo, Élie Sagatwa, and Séraphin Rwabu-
kumba became key ﬁgures within Habyarimana’s inner circle.52 Similarly, sociologist
André Guichaoua found that in honour of International Women’s Year in 1975,
Kanziga began establishing a “government of women”, which made and unmade
women deputies, pushing women to posts of greater responsibility and visibility, and “con-
trolled the women’s organizations that were authorized at the time”.53 For these reasons,
many Rwandans recall Kanziga as the real power behind Habyarimana’s presidency,
leading them to refer to her as “Kanjogera”, and “Umwamikazi” (queen).54 In doing so,
Habyarimana’s political authority was undermined by casting him as a man who was con-
trolled entirely by his wife and her powerful family.55
Take, for example, Philip Gourevitch’s recounting of the Mayuya Aﬀair, in which Kan-
ziga’s supporters allegedly assassinated one of Habyarimana’s most trusted conﬁdents.56
He notes:
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…Madame Agathe was called Kanjogera, after the wicked queen mother of Mwami Musinga,
the Lady Macbeth of Rwandan legend. Le clan de Madame, Agathe’s court within the court,
was known as the akazu, the little house. The akazu was the core of the concentric webs of
political, economic, and military muscle and patronage that came to be known as Hutu
Power. When the President crossed the akazu, he was quickly set straight. For instance,
Habyarimana once cultivated a protégé from outside the akazu, Colonel Stanislas Mayuya;
he liked Mayuya so much that one of the chiefs of the akazu had Mayuya shot dead. The
gunman was arrested; then he and the prosecutor on the case were also killed.57
This excerpt demonstrates the exceptional power enjoyed by Kanziga and her extended
family from the perspective of Gourevitch’s informants. However, beyond her eﬀorts to
minimize her husband’s independence, Kanziga is often referenced as the mastermind
of the 1994 genocide. Anthropologist Christopher Taylor documented the RPF’s eﬀorts
to cast Kanziga as Kanjogera through Radio Muhabura and other propaganda tools
during the Rwandan civil war.58 In particular, the RPF highlighted – accurately – the
role Kanziga played in demonizing the Tutsi minority as foreign invaders and enemies
of the Hutu majority through extremist media outlets. Among the Hutu Power ideologues
behind these media outlets was Hassan Ngeze, author of the infamous “Hutu Ten Com-
mandments”, which encouraged Hutu civilians to reject their Tutsi friends, spouses,
business associates, and comrades in arms.59 Historian and convicted génocidaire Ferdi-
nand Nahimana was a long-term critic of both what he perceived as violent conquest
by the Abanyiginya monarchs of the less powerful abahinza (northern, predominantly
Hutu, kings) who allegedly preceded them, as well as the historiography that cast the Aba-
nyiginya court as Rwanda’s shared national history. This antagonistic perspective on the
central court’s was one of the reasons he was drawn to Kanziga’s akazu.60 In doing so,
these extremists echoed the critiques of Hutu nationalists of the 1950s who objected to
the use of the royal drum Kalinga as a symbol of national unity, owing to the fact that
the drum once displayed the genitalia of conquered abahinza.61 To Hutu nationalists,
these were not ancient histories: the northwest’s incorporation into the modern
Rwandan state happened in the early twentieth century under Kanjogera’s leadership.
For the akazu, as well as many others, memories of the conquest and its fallout continue
to cause animus.
As in Kanjogera’s case, Kanziga’s transgression of contemporary Rwandan gender
norms is complicated by her alleged crimes and has resulted in social and political
stigmas that have followed her into exile. Yet the nature of the discourse surrounding
her legacy demonstrates the gendered dynamics of that critique. She is not simply labelled
a génocidaire: by calling her Kanjogera, her critics compare her to a historical ﬁgure whom
Kanziga undoubtedly hated, but who similarly exists within a Rwandan pantheon of elite
women.62 Furthermore, she is not just accused of ideological violence, like her male col-
leagues. Her violence, like that of other women génocidaires, is understood as more evil
precisely because of her womanhood.63 This is evident in the invocation of Kanjogera’s
monarchical power that is popularly understood as capricious, cruel, and tyrannical.
Jeannette Kagame
Meanwhile, in the years since Kanziga’s ﬂight from Rwanda, Rwanda’s current First Lady
has also been nicknamed Kanjogera, largely by an embittered political opposition in exile
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that conspires to overthrow her husband. Jeannette Kagame is – like her husband – a des-
cendent of a prestigious Abega lineage, who spent her youth in exile after her family ﬂed
ethnic and political violence surrounding Rwanda’s independence. She returned to
Rwanda as the wife of Paul Kagame, then the Vice President and Minister of Defence
in the new transitional government established in July 1994 by the RPF. In 2000, following
the controversial resignation of moderate Hutu President Pasteur Bizimungu (r. 1994–
2000), Paul Kagame became President, a position he has maintained through three alleg-
edly democratic elections.64 As First Lady, Jeannette Kagame is known as an intelligent,
hard-working humanitarian who performs an impressive range of charity work to
beneﬁt vulnerable people, including HIV/AIDS patients, widows and orphans of the gen-
ocide, and the rural poor. She is also a key ﬁgure in the struggle for women’s empower-
ment in modern Rwanda – an area the RPF has increasingly prioritized with varying
degrees of success.65
However, as Jeannette Kagame’s public visibility has increased, she has fallen victim to
gendered critiques of her work, particularly by Rwanda’s political opposition in exile – a
group that regards Kagame and the RPF as a threat to Rwanda’s long-term political stab-
ility.66 In these highly politicized circles, Jeannette Kagame is frequently nicknamed Kan-
jogera in reference to the power she allegedly exercises over her husband and his inner
circle to ensure the persecution of individuals whom she perceives to be a threat. It is
important to note that many of the allegations against Jeannette Kagame raised by
Rwanda’s political opposition in exile are impossible to substantiate. Indeed, we consider
these allegations solely to explore the authors’ anxieties around Jeannette Kagame as a
powerful woman, and do not read them as evidence of her involvement in the persecution
of perceived political subversives.
For example, one anonymous Ikaze Iwacu blog post from September 2013 references
Jeannette Kagame as the “queen from Hell”.67 Among the allegations raised by the
author are claims that Jeannette was directly complicit in persecuting Jeannette
Rwigema, the wife of Fred Rwigema, who prior to his unexpected assassination in 1990
was the charismatic leader of the RPF and anticipated President of the “New Rwanda”
that the RPF was ﬁghting to “liberate”. The blog claims that Jeannette Kagame was instru-
mental in bringing about the social and political demise of Jeannette Rwigema and her
sons. The implied purpose of her machinations was to ensure that Rwigema’s family
could never pose a threat to Paul Kagame’s legitimacy as president and Jeannette
Kagame’s legitimacy as First Lady. The blog’s author further claims “criminal Paul
Kagame who [sic] now wears the skirt and Jeannette Kagame now wears trousers,
meaning that Jeannette Kagame is the real Boss at Village Urugwiro”.68
For Rwandans, this trope of a woman political elite attacking her family’s perceived
enemies is a familiar one. As suggested by the stories of Giharamagara’s death and the
coup at Rucunshu, Kanjogera was allegedly willing to sacriﬁce anyone, even her own
family members, to secure her husband’s position. In a monarchical context, this is unsur-
prising: the power of the abagabekazi was dependent upon being married to, and then
being the mother of, the mwami. Therefore, the mwami’s security was of utmost impor-
tance to his umugabekazi, more so than other kinship ties. But the blog’s author seems
further incensed by Jeannette Kagame’s allegedly immoral and womanly behaviour by
Rwandan standards – referring to her as “a princess” and “a girl for bad boys”, among
other gendered accusations. This kind of gendered stigmatization would be similarly
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familiar to Rwandans given the dialectic of “male/female distinctions” that is prevalent in
Rwanda today.69
Another blog, Umuvugizi: The Voice of Rwanda, makes similar allegations, condemn-
ing Jeannette Kagame for having “mercilessly requested her husband President Kagame to
behead Major John Sengati on baseless charges as the only way to continue witch hunting
her former business partner Rosette Kayumba whose aunt was Major John Sengati’s
wife”.70 The blog’s author accuses Jeannette Kagame of using her feminine wiles – “bed
sweeting her husband” – to convince him to have Sengati killed, and then ties her manip-
ulations of the President to her business ambitions, which they condemn as greedy and
shameful. In this case, the author repeats a trope related not only to Kanjogera, but
more explicitly to Jeannette Kagame’s namesake, Umugabekazi Nyiramongi (r. 1847–
1863), a former umugabekazi who was Kanjogera’s aunt. In a narrative dedicated to Nyir-
amongi’s life story, she spirited her husband, Mwami Gahindiro, away from another
jealous wife, and cloistered him in her house for three days, after which he named her
son, Rwogera, his heir.71
Blogs such as Ikaze Iwacu and Umuvugizi speak to a disturbing trend among Rwanda’s
political opposition in exile, and perhaps among Rwandan society more broadly: the ten-
dency for those threatened or marginalized to attribute the ultimate political power under-
lying Paul Kagame’s regime to Jeannette Kagame. This serves a dual purpose. It
undermines the legitimacy and presidential authority of her husband, while simul-
taneously deﬂecting criticism from him, oﬀering protections to those deploying this criti-
cism from persecution using harassment, illegal detainment, forced exile, and even alleged,
assassinations.72 By concentrating on Jeannette, these critiques carry a certain plausible
deniability informed by deeper anxieties about women in power – that even a powerful
man with the best of intentions can be swayed by a capricious woman, especially by
unrestrained feminine sexuality. This certainly is the tenor of many oral traditions regard-
ing abagabekazi. The narrative creators who told these stories walked a ﬁne line between
acknowledging the agency of powerful women like Nyiramongi and Kanjogera, while at
the same time attributing their power to sexual manipulation. This theme is clearly and
unequivocally echoed from the oral traditions about Umugabekazi Nyiramongi to the
Umuvugizi blog’s accusations against Jeannette Kagame. However, in the present it
could arguably also express ongoing anxieties about the RPF’s eﬀorts to promote
gender equality throughout Rwanda’s society.
Conclusion: women in power, ambiguously
In a moment in which Rwanda is grappling with the rapid cultural shift brought on by its
ambitious gender equality initiatives, it is worth investigating why politically prominent
women – in this instance Agathe Kanziga and Jeannette Nyiramongi Kagame – are nick-
named Kanjogera. We have argued that this tendency is an expression of Rwandans’
anxieties around politically powerful women that derive from Rwandan gender norms
having shaped how Kanjogera is remembered in present-day popular culture, as well as
part of a broader eﬀort to delegitimise and emasculate their powerful husbands.
Rwanda, like many modern nations, faces obstacles in challenging gender inequality
including the risk of “patriarchal backlash” among its citizens.73 Some Rwandan
women occupy high proﬁle positions in civil service, for example, and their presence
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appears to have widespread public approval. However, these women civil servants are
often engaged in work that does not overtly challenge modern Rwandan gender norms.
In addition to Rwanda’s much-lauded women parliamentarians, in 2018 Rwanda
announced its ﬁrst gender-balanced Cabinet, and women ministers lead the ministries
of Gender and Family Promotion, Health, Public Service, and Agriculture and Animal
Resources, among others.74 In most instances, Rwandan women political elites are
engaged in roles to which women are regarded as well-suited: promoting health and
well-being, overseeing diplomacy, and managing public aﬀairs. In doing so, they follow
the model established by earlier generations of women genocide survivors who advocated
for gender equality by eschewing overtly feminist rhetoric in favour of “motherist” terms,
and relying on inﬂuential male allies “as conduits to further women’s interests”.75
Rwandan women appear to be excelling in these largely gender-conforming roles,
though debates exist regarding the extent to which they exercise genuine political
power. Political scientist Susan Thomson argues that while Rwandan women’s visibility
in public life is at an all-time high, their ability to shape their nation’s future is limited
by the RPF’s domination of Rwanda’s parliament: “[t]he number of Rwandan female par-
liamentarians glosses over their limited role in policymaking, the continued marginaliza-
tion of the vast majority of Rwandan women, and the government’s superﬁcial
commitment to democratic governance”.76 Put another way, as classicist Mary Beard
writes in her treatise on women and power: “But I do wonder if, in some places, the pres-
ence of large numbers of women in parliament means that parliament is where the power
is not”.77
Rwanda, it seems, like many nations around the world, has a complicated relationship
with women in positions of political authority. Indeed, as indicated by the cases of Agathe
Kanziga and Jeannette Kagame, where Rwandan women begin to transgress or are per-
ceived as transgressing gender norms, they risk condemnation as modern incarnations
of Kanjogera, among other gendered accusations. Power and gender are not easily
untangled. Those vices that are often associated with critiques of monarchical government
and the ﬂagrant misuse of power – cruelty, promiscuity, violence, and capriciousness –
overlap with and are congruent with fears about “unnatural” behaviours for women.
This, perhaps, has most to do with the fact that political power, as it is conceived in patri-
archal societies, is frequently the antithesis of values associated with idealized woman-
hood. In her survey of England’s pre-Elizabethan queens, historian Helen Castor writes,
But the converse of this exceptionalism—the fate of a woman who exercised authority in
ways perceived by a disapproving observer to be undesirable or illegitimate—was more per-
vasive and much more damaging, an inﬁnitely regressive double-bind in which female rulers
were all too easily trapped. Women were soft and weak, hence unﬁt to rule; but a woman who
showed herself to be strong was not the equivalent of a man, but a monster, a crime against
nature.78
Despite the vastly diﬀerent cultural context, the questions Castor raises can be applied to
patriarchal contexts across the globe: if gendered expectations are such that women who
embody any of the hallmarks of masculine power are perceived as monstrous, how can we
reconcile attempts to empower women with the inevitably negative consequences? The
answer, it may be, lies in redeﬁning both gender and power by destigmatizing femininity
and stripping power of its masculine bias.
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